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Review Essay 
THE AKIDL REED AMAR BILL OF RIGHTS 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION. By Akhil Reed Amar.' New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 412. Cloth, $30.00. 
Edward A. Hartnetl 
Akhil Reed Amar has been called many things, including an 
elitist/ a deconstructionist,4 a progressive,5 a fox,6 and even a pro-
tector of Dirty Harry.7 Naturally, his newest book, The Bill of 
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, defies easy categorization. 
Cass Sunstein has dubbed the book "originalism for liberals,"8 
even though Amar himself resists being labeled an originalist.9 
1. Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. 
2. Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; Visiting Associate Professor 
(Fall 1998), Scholar in Residence (Spring 1999), University of Virginia School of Law. 
Thanks to Barry Cushman, Michael Klarman, and Michael Paulsen for helpful discus-
sion. 
3. Robert C. Palmer, Akhil Amar: Elitist Populist and Anti-textual Textualist, 16 S. 
Ill. u. L.J. 3!J7 (1992). 
4. Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar's Wishing Well, 
62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1993). 
5. Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal 
Procedure Liberalism, 107 Yale L.J. 2281,2281 (1998) (reviewing Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles). 
6. Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History,ll Yale L.J. & Human. 191, 
213 (1999) (reviewing Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations (Harvard U. 
Press, 1998) and Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 
(Yale U. Press, 1998) (noting "as a hedgehog, I have always found much to admire in the 
legal foxes who come tramping (or occasionally trampling) through the neighborhood."). 
7. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Diny Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1457, 1463 (19!J7) ("Dirty Harry's basic instinct was right. He just needed the con-
stitutional scholarship of Akhil Amar to cover his back."). 
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Origina/ism for Liberals, The New Republic 31 (Sept. 28, 
1998). 
9. Amar calls himself "a constitutionalist, a textualist, and a populist." Akhil Reed 
Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65 Ford. L. Rev. 
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As I hope to show, Amar is right to resist: The Bill of Rights: 
Creation and Reconstruction is more about transforming than re-
capturing original meaning. 
One of the book's striking features is its religious tone and 
imagery. For example, Amar writes about "words made flesh," 
(p. 27) "original sin," (p. 293) and "renounc[ing] the Slave Power 
and all its works." (p. 294) Indeed, the overall structure of the 
book is itself almost biblical. As the subtitle suggests, part one 
of the book is called "Creation," and part two is called "Recon-
struction." I suspect that part two might well have been called 
"Redemption" if that term had not become so associated with 
the violent overthrow of Reconstruction state governments by 
ex-confederates and their sympathizers.10 
Although the two parts draw heavily from two articles pre-
viously published in the Yale Law Journal/1 the overall project is 
far clearer in the book with the two parts conjoined. Amar's 
thesis is that the Bill of Rights at its creation was largely con-
cerned with issues of governmental structure and popular sover-
eignty, but that the Fourteenth Amendment changed the Bill of 
Rights into a protector of individual liberties. Amar contends 
that today we unselfconsciously see the creation through the lens 
of the reconstruction. In part one of the book, he attempts to 
show us the Bill of Rights without that distortion. In part two, 
he strives to explain how the Fourteenth Amendment trans-
formed the Bill of Rights. The major difference in content be-
tween the book and the articles is that the article on the Four-
teenth Amendment only addressed how the First Amendment's 
rights of expression were transformed, while the book adds a 
discussion of the transformation of the rest of the Bill of Rights.12 
This essay follows the same organizational scheme as the 
book. Part I of the essay describes Amar's view of the creation 
of the Bill of Rights., while Part II describes Amar's view of the 
1657, 1657 (1997). 
10. See, e.g., Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished RevoluJion 1863-
1877 at 564-601 (Harper & Row, 1988). 
11. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 
(1991); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale 
L.J. 1193 (1992). 
12. Compare Amar, 101 Yale L.J. at 1272-73 (cited in note 11) ("A full demonstra-
tion of the model's application to each and every clause of the original Bill must await 
another day; but the speech, press, petition, and assembly clauses of the First Amend-
ment provide a handy testing ground ... ") (footnote omitted) with Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 246-83 ("Creation and Reconstruction") 
(Yale U. Press, 1998) (applying his model to the rest of the Bill of Rights). 
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Bill's reconstruction. Readers who want to gain a passing fa-
miliarity with Amar's arguments should start with these parts; 
readers already familiar with the articles on which the book is 
based might want to skim ahead to part II-B, where I discuss 
Amar's claims regarding the transformation of the Bill of Rights, 
or even cut to the chase in Part III, where I offer some criticisms. 
Most significantly, I suggest in Part III that there is a gap be-
tween Amar's methodology and his conclusions: while he pro-
vides a persuasive account of what the Bill of Rights meant in 
1868, he has not, on his own methodology, provided an account 
of what the Bill of Rights means today. 
I 
Amar asks us to remove "modern blinders" that lead us to 
take nationalism for granted and look to the national govern-
ment (and especially the national courts) to protect individuals 
and minorities against state government. (pp. 3-4) He reminds 
us that in 1760, '"Virginia' was, legally speaking, an obvious fait 
accompli-its House of Burgesses had been meeting since the 
1620's-but 'America,' as a legal entity, was still waiting to be 
born." (p. 5) One of the functions of colonial legislatures, Amar 
notes, was to monitor the central government in England, publi-
cizing its oppression, and organizing opposition to its evils. (p. 5) 
Although Amar acknowledges that Federalists sought to 
strengthen the national government and limit abusive state gov-
ernment, he emphasizes the continuity of the tradition of local 
governments acting to "protect citizens against abuses by central 
authority." (p. 4) For Amar, among Madison's crucial insights 
was that "localism and liberty can sometimes work together." 
(p. 7) 
With this perspective, Amar takes us to the Bill of Rights. 
Amar, however, does not start with our First Amendment, but 
rather with their first amendment-that is, the first amendment 
proposed by the first Congress. That amendment, which was 
never ratified, would have changed the original constitution's 
requirement that the number of representatives in the House of 
Representatives not exceed one for every thirty thousand, and 
instead required that the number equal one for every thirty 
thousand until there were one hundred representatives. (The 
proposed amendment provided a second set of rules once that 
size was reached, and a third set of rules once the size of the 
House of Representatives reached two hundred.) The point of 
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the amendment was to respond to Anti-Federalist critiques that 
Congress would be too small, elite, and subject to cabal. Some 
targeted the size of the Senate, noting that in a body with 
twenty-six members, a majority of a quorum would consist of but 
eight Senators. (p. 11) Patrick Henry pointed out that the 
House of Representatives might even be worse: since each state 
was only guaranteed one representative and no minimum size or 
ratio to population was mandated in the original constitution, 
the House of Representatives could be as small as thirteen. (p. 
12) For Amar, although their first amendment failed of ratifica-
tion (by one state), it reveals the extent to which those at the 
creation of the Bill of Rights were concerned about ensuring that 
the new national government not be run by elites disdainful of 
their lowly constituents. (p. 11) 
Before turning to our First Amendment, Amar makes a 
similar point about their second (our Twenty-Seventh) amend-
ment. That amendment prevents changes in Congressional pay 
from taking effect without an intervening election. As Amar 
notes, this amendment was designed to limit the ability of Con-
gressmen to "line their own pockets at public expense." (p. 18) 
Both amendments "shared a fundamentally similar outlook; 
both addressed the 'agency cost' problem of government-pos-
sible self-dealing among government 'servants' who may be 
tempted to plunder their 'masters,' the people-rather than the 
analytically distinct problem of protecting minorities of ordinary 
citizens from tyrannical majorities." (p. 18) Having primed the 
reader with the first two provisions of their bill of rights, provi-
sions that sound in governmental structure and the protection of 
majoritarian power against self-interested government elites, 
Amar then turns to the task of finding similar concerns in our 
Bill of Rights. 
For Amar, the "historical and structural core" of our First 
Amendment's protection of the freedom of speech and of the 
press was, like their first two amendments, "to safeguard the 
rights of popular majorities ... against a possibly unrepresenta-
tive and self-interested Congress." (p. 21) He describes theSe-
dition Act as a "textbook example of attempted self-dealing 
among the people's agents" that was not invalidated by any 
court. Instead, prompted by the free speech within state legisla-
tures, it was "adjudicated" to violate the First Amendment by a 
popular majority, working with and through those legislatures, in 
the election of 1800. (p. 23) Amar similarly links the idea of 
protecting popular speech criticizing the government to the long-
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standing rule against prior restraint, observing that prior re-
straints would be enforced by permanent government officials, 
while subsequent civil and criminal prosecutions would involve 
ordinary citizens, empowered as jurors to protect such a pub-
lisher. (pp. 23-24) 
In this view, the rights of assembly and petition are also at 
their core "collective and popular" rights of the people as a 
whole. (p. 30) Thus the most basic way in which "the right of 
the people [peaceably] to assemble" can be exercised is in a con-
stitutional convention empowered to alter or abolish govern-
ment. (p. 26) Here, Amar links the right of the people to as-
semble with the Constitution's preamble (which might be better 
described as the Constitution's "ordination" clause, or even, if 
the name were not already taken, the "establishment" clause): 
The Preamble's dramatic opening words ... trumpeted the Con-
stitution's underlying theory of popular sovereignty. Those words 
and that theory implied a right of the "people" . . . to alter or 
abolish their government whenever they deemed proper: what "the 
People" had "ordain[ ed] and established]" . . . , they or their 
"posterity" could disestablish at will . . . . To good lawyers of the 
late 1780s, [these were] frrst principles-words made flesh by the 
Constitution itself. The Constitution, after all, was not just a text, 
but an act-a doing, a constituting. In the Preamble's performative 
utterance, "We the people ... do" alter the old and ordain and es-
tablish the new. (p. 27) 
When Amar turns to the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment, he emphasizes that the establishment clause not 
only prevents Congress from establishing a national church, but 
also prevents it from disestablishing state establishments. (p. 32) 
The clause is "agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment 
versus nonestablishment and simply calls for the issue to be de-
cided locally." (p. 34) One function of the eighteenth century 
established churches, as Amar notes, was "imparting community 
values and promoting moral conduct among ordinary citizens, 
upon whose virtue republican government ultimately rests." (p. 
44) National control over such a powerful intermediate associa-
tion "obviously struck fear in the hearts of Anti-Federalists" 
while state and local establishments "would encourage participa-
tion and community spirit among ordinary citizens at the grass 
roots." (p. 45) Again, the right protected is a collective one of 
local majorities against a central government. More generally, 
Amar uses the religion clauses as an occasion to suggest that the 
entire First Amendment, beginning as it does with the phrase 
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"Congress shall make no law," is a declaration of the lack of 
enumerated Congressional power "to regulate religion in the 
states or restrict speech," serving, in effect, as "a kind of reverse 
'necessary and proper' clause." (pp. 36-37) 
Determined not to ignore parts of the bill of rights that 
many find embarrassing today, Amar devotes a chapter to the 
military amendments, our Second and Third Amendments. 
Again, he finds the core concern to be protection of the collec-
tive people against an abusive federal government. Here, 
though, the focus is the fear that federal military power could be 
used to render meaningless the right of the people to assemble in 
convention and reassert their sovereignty. (pp. 46-47) For 
Amar, the "people" in our Second Amendment and the "peo-
ple" in the preamble are the same: the ones who ordained and 
established the constitution are the ones whom Congress cannot 
disarm. (pp. 48-49) Although he acknowledges the importance 
of state governments in responding to central tyranny by organ-
izing and mobilizing their citizens into an "effective fighting 
force capable of besting even a large standing army," (p. 50) 
Amar insists that our Second Amendment is not only a right of 
state governments. Instead, he emphasizes that the word "mili-
tia" in 1789 "referred to all citizens capable of bearing arms-
that is, the 'militia' is identical to 'the people."' (p. 51) 
Still more strikingly, Amar uses our Second Amendment as 
the capstone to an argument that a national draft is unconstitu-
tional. Here, Amar argues that Article I, section 8, distinguishes 
between "Armies"-which Congress has the power to "raise and 
support" -and "the Militia" -where Congressional power is 
more tightly constrained. Congress has the power to "provide 
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Law of the Union, 
suppress Insurrection and repel Invasion." (p. 53) It also has 
the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the 
militia, subject to state power to appoint officers and the conduct 
of training. Amar observes that in 1789, while the word "militia" 
was equivalent to "the people," the word "army" meant a mer-
cenary force of hired guns, "typically considered the dregs of so-
ciety-men without land, homes, families, or principles." (p. 53) 
While Congress has authority to federalize the militia, it can only 
do so for particular purposes and remains subject to the state 
power to appoint the officers and conduct the training. These 
restrictions would "become trivial" if Congress could simply 
"relabel[] militiamen as army 'soldiers' conscriptable at will." 
(p. 54) Amar explains the importance of the distinction between 
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the army and the militia and the restrictions on Congressional 
power over the militia: 
Wretches miserable enough to volunteer as hired guns might de-
serve whatever treatment they got at the hands of army officers, 
but citizens wrenched by conscription from their land, their homes, 
and their families deserved better. They were entitled to be placed 
in units with fellow citizens from their own locality, and officered 
by local leaders ... men whom they were likely to know directly 
or indirectly from civilian society and who were likely to know 
them. The ordinary harshness of military discipline would be tem-
pered by the many social, economic, and political linkages that 
predated military service and that would be renewed thereafter. 
Officers would know that, in a variety of ways, they could be 
called to account back home after the fighting was over. (pp. 54-
55) 
For Amar, if the Second Amendment "is not about the critical 
difference between the vaunted 'well regulated Militia' of 'the 
people' and the disfavored standing army, it is about nothing." 
(p. 56) 
Here, Amar calls to his aid Daniel Webster, who argued 
against the constitutionality of a proposed national draft during 
the War of 1812. Webster called the proposal an attempt to 
raise "a standing army out of the militia by draft," and a number 
of New England states denounced as unconstitutional any na-
tional attempt to "to subject[] the militia ... to forcible drafts, 
conscriptions, or impressment." (pp. 57-58) Amar notes that 
none of the proposed draft bills passed and suggests that the 
"eventual republican triumph on this issue ... should be as cen-
tral a precedent for our Second Amendment as the 1800 triumph 
over the Sedition Act is for our First." (p. 58) 
As Amar sees it, the Third Amendment, which outlaws the 
forced quartering of soldiers in time of peace, and requires that 
wartime quartering be done as prescribed by law, guards against 
"military threats too subtle and stealthy for the Second's 'well 
regulated Militia."' (p. 59) Citing the English Bill of Rights of 
1689, the Declaration of Independence, and various state consti-
tutions, Amar observes that opposition to standing armies, main-
taining civilian control of the military, and restricting the quar-
tering of soldiers have long been linked. Once again, the focus 
for Amar is on maintaining effective democratic control over 
those who wield power. 
For Amar, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
amendments, all use the jury as a method of local popular con-
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trol over government officials. Indeed, Amar declares that juries 
are "at the heart of the Bill of Rights." (p. 83) "The dominant 
strategy to keep agents of the central government under control 
was to use the populist and local institution of the jury." (p. 83) 
It was juries who were empowered to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment by determining the reasonableness of searches and 
seizures in tort claims against individual officers. To illustrate 
the point with a foundational story, Amar recounts the trespass 
action by House of Commons Member John Wilkes, who suc-
cessfully challenged searches that were· designed to suppress his 
communication to constituents that was critical of George III. 
(p. 67) Warrants were disfavored-hence the requirement that 
no warrants issue but upon probable cause-because they oper-
ated to shift power over searches from jurors to judges. (p. 69) 
Similarly, Amar treats the Fifth Amendment's protection of the 
grand jury indictment, the Sixth Amendment's protection of the 
local criminal jury, and the Seventh Amendment's protection of 
the civil jury trial, as akin to the Second Amendment's protec-
tion of the militia: "Just as the militia could check a paid profes-
sional standing army, the jury could thwart overreaching by 
powerful and ambitious prosecutors and judges." (p. 84) Here, 
Amar recounts the refusal of New York grand juries to indict 
John Peter Zenger and (when the government proceeded by in-
formation), his acquittal by the petit jury. (pp. 84-85) Even the 
Fifth Amendment's taking clause and the Eighth Amendment 
reflect the centrality of jury power: a jury determines what com-
pensation is "due," while the Eighth Amendment (like the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant clause) constrains the functions 
performed by judges without juries: setting bail and imposing 
sentence. (pp. 80, 87) 
Amar draws further links between the militia and the jury: 
both are local institutions, "composed of citizens from the same 
community [and] expected to be informed by community val-
ues." {pp. 88-89) The Sixth Amendment is explicit in its local-
ism, further particularizing Article Ill's guarantee of a local 
criminal jury, but Amar-in an argument new to the book13 -
suggests that the best reading of the Seventh Amendment is 
localist in a somewhat different way: federal courts must use a 
civil jury if the local state courts would. (p. 89) Moreover, both 
militia and jury are "intermediate association[s] designed to 
13. Compare Amar, 100 Yale L.J. at 1186 (cited in note 11) (one paragraph section 
concerning "jurors as provincials") with Amar, "CreaJion and Reconstruction" at 88-93 
(cited in note 12) (five page section concerning "jurors as provincials" making the state-
law-incorporation argument). 
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and jury are "intermediate association[s] designed to educate 
and socialize [their] members into virtuous thinking and con-
duct." (p. 93) Here, Amar relies on Tocqueville, who described 
the civil jury as "a gratuitous public school, ever open, in which 
every juror learns his rights, enters into daily communication 
with the most learned and enlightened members of the upper 
classes, and becomes practically acquainted with the laws, which 
are brought within his capacity by the efforts of the bar, the ad-
vice of the judge, and even the passions of the parties .... " (p. 
93) 
A jury, however, is not simply to sit quietly and listen as 
obedient schoolchildren. Instead, a jury sits as a political body, 
the "lower house" of the judiciary (p. 95), no more waivable 
than the House of Representatives (pp. 104-08) and (maybe) 
armed with the power of "jury review"- that is, the power to re-
fuse to enforce a statute that the jury concludes is unconstitu-
tional. (pp. 98-104) 
Amar dubs the Ninth and Tenth Amendments the "popular 
sovereignty amendments" because of their "invocations of 'the 
people."' (p. 119) The Tenth Amendment echoes the preamble: 
we the people have delegated some powers to the federal gov-
ernment, permit others to be exercised by state governments, 
and have withheld some from both. (pp. 119-20) Similarly, 
Amar contends that the Ninth Amendment is about retained 
collective rights of the people, most significantly, the right of the 
people to alter or abolish government. (p. 122) Moreover, these 
two amendments "elegantly integrate popular sovereignty with 
federalism. All government power derives from the people, but 
these grants of power are limited." (p. 123) The Ninth Amend-
ment warns readers not to infer implicit federal power from the 
enumeration of rights; the Tenth textually reaffirms the struc-
tural scheme of the people conquering government power by di-
viding it between two rival governments. (pp. 123-24) 
In sum, Amar urges us to see the Bill of Rights at its crea-
tion as "attentive to structure, focused on the agency problem of 
government, and rooted in the sovereignty of We the People of 
the United States." (p. 127) It protects three intermediate asso-
ciations-church, militia, and jury-all of which educate the 
people about their rights and duties, thus enabling their sover-
eignty. (p. 133) He hopes we notice that "no phrase appears in 
more of the first ten amendments than 'the people."' (p. 133) 
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If Amar had stopped here-as his 1991 article did-it might 
seem that he was calling for radical changes in our current inter-
pretation of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, he admits that his point 
in part one is to "contest conventional wisdom." (p. xv) But, in 
part two, he argues that the Fourteenth Amendment-particu-
larly its privileges or immunities clause-transformed the Bill of 
Rights from one focused on republican, collective, public rights 
designed to control the agency costs of government into one fo-
cused on liberal, individual, private rights designed to protect 
minorities. (p. 133} To understand Amar's larger project, we 
must consider his account of the "reconstruction" of the Bill of 
Rights. 
II 
A 
Just as Amar does not start his account of the creation of 
the Bill of Rights with our First Amendment, but instead with 
the failed first amendment from the first Congress, so too Amar 
does not start his account of the Fourteenth Amendment with 
the text or with the debates in Congress or its Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction. Instead, he devotes a chapter to 
"Antebellum Ideas," including, most prominently, the ideas of 
those he calls "Barron contrarians." (p. 145) 
Amar acknowledges the correctness of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Barron v. Baltimore14 that the Bill of Rights only lim-
ited the national government, not the states. For Amar, Barron 
"kept faith with both the letter and the spirit of the original Bill 
of Rights." (p. 144} Nevertheless, Amar recounts and explains 
the view of those, both before and after Barron, who rejected its 
view of the Bill of Rights. 
Prior to Barron, "a considerable number of considerable 
lawyers" -including Justices Johnson and Baldwin of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the New York Supreme 
Court, the Mississippi Supreme Court, and treatise author Wil-
liam Rawle- "implied in passing or stated explicitly that various 
provisions in the Bill did limit states." (p. 145) And Barron was 
"hardly the last word, and the contrary view persisted over the 
next thirty-three years." (p. 146) Amar acknowledges that 
sometimes, as in an 1845 opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court 
14. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
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and the 1847 oral argument of the Attorney General of Ohio be-
fore the Supreme Court of the United States, the point may have 
been a casual assumption or a glib concession. {p. 146) But 
Amar also points to the frontal attack on Barron launched by 
the former Governor of New Hampshire in oral argument be-
fore the Supreme Court in 1840, and the self-conscious decisions 
rejecting Barron b¥ the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1846 and 
1852. (pp. 153-56)1 
Amar insists that we not "dismiss all these folks as dolts," 
but rather understand how such a view of the Bill of Rights fit in 
with basic assumption of legal thought at the time. In particular, 
Amar reminds us that judges at the time did not conceive of 
themselves as making up common law, but rather as finding it in 
authoritative sources. (p. 147) On this view, then, the Bill of 
Rights was, like Magna Charta and the English Bill of Rights of 
1689, "at least declaratory of certain fundamental common-law 
rights." (p. 147) This declaratory view, especially when com-
bined with an emphasis on natural rights, "insisted that rights 
were different from structure." (p. 152) "To a nineteenth-
century believer in natural rights, the Bill was not simply an en-
actment of We the People as the Sovereign Legislature bringing 
new legal rights into existence, but rather a declaratory judgment 
by We the People as the Sovereign High Court that certain natu-
ral or fundamental rights already existed." {p. 148) 
The Barron contrarians, Amar concedes, were "a distinct 
minority among antebellum lawyers." But, he contends, "time 
was on their side." (p. 156) Technology linked the national gov-
ernment to the hinterlands, reducing the fear of a distant na-
tional government. {pp. 156-57) Geographic expansion 
"worked ideological inversions" by raising puzzling questions 
about why a territory should be bound by the Bill of Rights yet 
free from such constraints upon achieving statehood. (p. 157) 
Indeed, Congressman John Bingham-the father of the four-
teenth amendment-contended in 1859 that Oregon, upon ad-
mission to the Union, would (like all other states) be limited by 
the rights guaranteed in the federal constitution. (p. 158) Amar 
makes the geographic point by contrasting the biographies of 
Madison, Jefferson, and Henry with that of Bingham: 
15. The family of the Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin of the Georgia Supreme Court 
taught at least one of his slaves to read: William Finch later became an Atlanta Oty 
Councilman. Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution at 359 (cited in 
note 10). 
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As white, male, propertied Virginians, Madison, Jefferson, and 
Henry belonged to an ongoing republic that had been practicing 
self-government for 150 years before the Constitution came along. 
Thus the Virginia House of Burgesses was already older for them 
than the Fourteenth Amendment is for us today. In a deep sense, 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights was for them prior to the federal 
Bill of Rights. Chronologically and perhaps emotionally, Virginia 
came first, before the Union. But not for Bingham, or for an entire 
generation of later Americans growing up in places like Ohio. Be-
fore Ohio was even a state, it was a federal territory, governed by 
the federal Constitution and the Union's Northwest Ordinance. 
For Bingham, these documents came first, framing the state and 
constraining its lawful powers. (p. 158) 
Most importantly, slavery both led the slave states "to vio-
late virtually every right and freedom declared in the Bill," and 
led abolitionist lawyers to develop "increasingly elaborate theo-
ries of natural rights, individual liberty, and higher law, theories 
far more compatible with a declaratory reading of the federal 
Bill" than with Barron. (pp. 160-61) Here, Amar observes that 
"Ohioan [and later Chief Justice] Salmon P. Chase's famous oral 
argument" in a 1847 fugitive slave case described the Bill of 
Rights as provisions that "announce restrictions upon the legisla-
tive power, imposed by the very nature of society and govern-
ment, [rather] than create restrictions, which were they erased 
from the constitution, the Legislature would be at liberty to dis-
regard." (p. 162) Eventually, the Civil War, by demonstrating 
that "states required constitutional constraints as well," made 
Barron seem "plainly anachronistic." (p. 162) 
Only after acquainting us with the mindset of the Barron 
contrarian does Amar tum to the text and history of the Four-
teenth Amendment. For Amar, the key to incorporation is not 
the due process clause; instead, the crucial language of the 
amendment is the first clause of the second sentence of section 1: 
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." The 
opening phrase ("No State shall") was consciously designed to 
provide precisely what the Supreme Court had found missing 
from the Bill of Rights in Barron. (pp. 164-65) Relying on 
sources ranging from the Oxford English Dictionary and Black-
stone to various treaties of territorial accession, Amar agrees 
with Michael Kent Curtis16 that the words "rights, liberties, privi-
16. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Duke U. Press, 1986). 
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leges, and immunities, seem to have been used interchangeably." 
(pp. 166-68) Moreover, in "ordinary, everyday language we of-
ten speak of the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights as 
declaring and defining the rights of Americans as Americans." 
(p. 170) Indeed, Amar notes, the Supreme Court in Dred Scott17 
"labeled the entitlements in the federal Bill, 'rights and privi-
leges of the citizen' and described 'liberty of speech,' the right 'to 
hold public meetings upon political affairs,' and the freedom to 
'keep and carry arms' as 'privileges and immunities of citizens,"' 
even as it denied that non-citizens were entitled to any of these 
rights, privileges, or immunities. (p. 169) 
Amar recounts statements by Congressman John Bingham, 
Congressman James Wilson, Senator Jacob Howard-most from 
1866, but one from Bingham as early as 1859-describing the 
rights and freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights as among the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. (pp. 
181-86) He notes that the New York Times described one of 
Bingham's major 1866 speeches as "a proposition to arm the 
Congress ... with the power to enforce the Bill of Rights as it 
stood," and that Bingham published the speech with the subtitle, 
"in support of the proposed amendment to enforce the bill of 
rights." (p. 187) Amar emphasizes that "the vast majority of 
Republican leaders in 1866 were contrarian." (p. 204) While 
some such as Bingham were "highly conscious" of the Barron 
decision, "others had apparently never heard of the case." (p. 
204) For this reason, the "biggest section 1 debate among Re-
publicans was not what the words meant, but whether the words 
were necessary, given that the rights they protected already ex-
isted." (pp. 204-05) In addition, Amar points to numerous post-
1866 statements by figures such as Senator John Sherman, Judge 
(later Justice) William Woods, Justice Joseph Bradley, U.S. At-
torney Daniel Corbin, and the authors of three major contempo-
raneous constitutional treatises, reflecting the view that the 
rights and freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights are among 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
protected by section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. (pp. 
208-11) 
Amar rejects the common argument that incorporation via 
the privileges or immunities clause renders the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment redundant, noting that the 
due process clause is broader-protecting "persons," including 
17. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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aliens-not only citizens. (p. 172) He notes that Congressman 
Bingham and Senator Howard both distinguished between safe-
guarding the privileges and immunities of citizens and providing 
due process and equal protection to all persons, whether citizen 
or stranger. (pp. 172-73) 
Significantly, Amar also has a response to the common ob-
jection that if incorporation were truly intended, "other lan-
guage could have been used that would have expressed the pur-
pose more clearly." (p. 174) For Amar, the privileges and 
immunities of citizens are both broader and narrower than the 
Bill of Rights. (p. 175) The Fourteenth Amendment, in Amar's 
view, does not use the words "first eight amendments" or "Bill 
of Rights" for a double reason: "not just because these words 
would have meant too little, but also because they would have 
meant too much." (p. 180) 
The privileges and immunities of citizens are broader than 
the Bill of Rights in two ways. First, they encompass such privi-
leges as the writ of habeas corpus described in the unamended 
constitution. Second, they encompass common law rights as 
well. As Justice Washington put it in Corfield v. Coryell,18 the 
leading case interpreting the privileges and immunities clause of 
Article IV, they include all rights that 
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citi-
zens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been 
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this 
Union [including] ... [p]rotection by the government; the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess prop-
erty of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety. 
(p. 177) 
The privileges and immunities of citizens are also narrower 
than the Bill of Rights, because, as Amar argues in part one, the 
Bill of Rights embodies structural concerns and "intertwine[s] 
rights and structure." (p. 180) The relevant question for incor-
poration, then, is "whether a given provision of the Constitution 
or Bill really does declare a privilege or immunity of citizens 
rather than, for example, a right of states." (p. 180) In other 
words, "[i]nstead of asking whether a given provision is funda-
mental ... , we must ask whether it is a personal privilege-that 
is, a private right-of individuals citizens, rather than a right of 
18. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (Cir. a. E.D. Pa. 1823). 
1999] AMAR BILL OF RIGHTS 387 
states or the public at large." (p. 221) Amar dubs this approach 
"refined incorporation." (p. 180) 
Amar also posits a striking corollary to his theory of "re-
fined incorporation": Not only does the meaning of the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights change as those provisions are filtered 
through the privileges or immunities clause, but the Fourteenth 
Amendment also has a "feedback effect" that works to alter 
their meaning as applied to the national government. (pp. 243-
44, 281) In other words, according to Amar, the Fourteenth 
Amendment not only limited the states in a more libertarian and 
individualistic way than the original Bill of Rights had limited 
the national government, it also transformed those original limits 
on the national government into more libertarian and individu-
alistic restrictions. 
B 
Amar then applies his theory of refined incorporation to 
each of the specific provisions in the Bill of Rights. He argues 
that the First Amendment's speech, press, assembly, and petition 
clauses are privileges of citizens; indeed, "these freedoms and 
rights are ... easy cases for full application against states." (p. 
234) So, too, is the free exercise of religion, particularly in light 
of the religious roots of abolitionism (p. 237) and Republican 
outrage over "decades of religious persecution in the antebellum 
South." (p. 254) Amar contends, however, that "the very 
meaning of freedom of speech, press, petition, and assembly was 
subtly refined in the process of being incorporated," because the 
paradigm case was no longer "a relatively popular publisher 
saying relatively popular things critical of less popular govern-
ment officials," but instead unpopular outsiders- Unionists, 
abolitionists, and freedmen such as Samuel Hoar, Harriet 
Beecher Stowe, and Frederick Douglass- "who were critical of 
dominant social institutions and opinions." (pp. 236-37) As a 
result, the institutional protector shifted from jury to life-tenured 
judge. (pp. 242-43) Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment's 
emphasis on minority liberty might have altered the meaning of 
free exercise and thereby justify "special judicial accommodation 
of minority sects" under the free exercise clause. (p. 256) 
The establishment clause proves far more difficult for 
Amar. Pointing to clauses in state and territorial constitutions in 
the 1840's through 60's that bar state laws "respecting an estab-
lishment of religion," he notes that the meaning of this phrase 
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was shifting from its original meaning as a federalism-based, lo-
cal option provision in the federal constitution to a more anti-
establishment meaning. (pp. 249-52) Yet he remains reluctant 
to say that the establishment clause can really be viewed as a 
"private right of discrete individuals." (p. 252) Ultimately, he 
ducks the issue of whether the establishment clause should be 
incorporated, contenting himself with the observation that 
"principles of religious liberty and equality could be vindicated 
via the free-exercise clause ... and the equal-protection clause." 
(p. 254) 
Amar is less coy when he turns to the Second Amendment. 
He views the right to keep and bear arms as a "paradigmatic" 
privilege of citizens of the United States. (p. 257) He notes that 
prior to the Civil War, antislavery theorists argued that citizens 
had a personal right to own guns for self-protection, and Chief 
Justice Taney, in Dred Scott, agreed that if free blacks were citi-
zens, they would have the privilege "to keep and carry arms 
wherever they went." (pp. 262-63) While at the founding, arms 
bearing in militias was a political right like voting, office holding, 
and jury service, Reconstruction Republicans recast the right 
into an individual civil right of citizens-including not-yet en-
franchised freedmen and women-to self-protection. (pp. 258-
59) Here, Amar points not only to statements by numerous 
members of Congress, but also to the Freedman's Bureau Act 
which stated that "laws ... concerning persona/liberty, personal 
security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of es-
tate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear 
arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens." (p. 
260) In short, the paradigm case shifted from the "the Concord 
minutemen" fighting the central government to "the Carolina 
freedman" defending himself, his home, and his family from the 
Klan. (p. 266) He advises the NRA to pay less attention to 
1775-91 and more attention to 1830-68. (p. 266) 
Amar suggests that the Third Amendment, like the Second 
Amendment, was "privatized and domesticated" by the privi-
leges or immunities clause. Originally it reflected "classic re-
publican skepticism of peacetime armies," but, as a privilege of 
citizens, is better understood as protecting the privacy of the 
homestead. (p. 267) The Fourth Amendment, which "was from 
the beginning protective of the private domain," is a "rather easy 
case for incorporation." (p. 267) So, too, is the Fifth Amend-
ment's just compensation clause, the most individualistic item in 
the Bill of Rights and the subject of Barron itself. Not only did 
1999] AMAR BILL OF RIGHTS 389 
Representative Bingham and Senator Howard both specifically 
discuss Barron and just compensation, but "virtually all mid-
nineteenth-century jurists deemed just compensation a funda-
mental principle of justice." (pp. 268-69) 
As for the jury provisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Amendments, Amar contends that "the story is far more compli-
cated than has been understood by courts and commentators 
thus far." (p. 269) He notes that in 1866, all juries-grand, petit, 
and civil-had long been considered both "privileges" and basic 
components of due process. (p. 269) In Amar's view, while "the 
Founders emphasized Americans' rights to participate in gov-
ernment by serving in juries, Reconstructors ... emphasized the 
right to be tried by juries." (271) In thus mutating a political 
right to be a juror into a civil right to be tried by a jury,19 they 
built on the experience of abolitionists who "had repeatedly 
stressed the fundamentality of jury trials" in protecting those 
claimed to be fugitive slaves. (p. 269) Salmon P. Chase, for ex-
ample, unsuccessfully argued on behalf of a black women named 
Matilda Lawrence that she was entitled to a jury trial before be-
ing snatched away from Ohio as a slave. (p. 270) Some northern 
states enacted laws requiring a jury trial in such cases, but the 
Supreme Court found such laws beyond state authority in Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania.']JJ (p. 270) Similarly, opponents of the 1850 Fu-
gitive Slave Act, such as Senator Charles Sumner, argued that it 
unconstitutionally deprived the claimed slave of the right to a 
jury trial. (p. 270) Thus it would seem, all of the jury rights 
should be considered privileges of citizens of the United States, 
protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
Amar observes, however, that the "Founder's jury right was 
not merely political and collective; it was also localist." (p. 274) 
As a result, the aspects of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments 
19. Amar also claims that "the Fifteenth Amendment rightly read, affirms blacks' 
political rights-to vote, serve on juries, and hold office-just as the Fourteenth 
Amendment had affirmed blacks' civil rights to do virtually everything but." (p. 273) He 
does not attempt to reconcile this claims with the explicit decision by the Fortieth Con-
gress-well aware of the Georgia legislature's refusal to seat duly elected black mem-
bers-to limit the proposed Fifteenth Amendment to voting and to delete any protection 
of office holding. See Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress, 1863-69 
at 147-55 (U. Press of Kansas, 1990). He does, however, cite his brother's article which 
has made the attempt. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Politiad Participation 
Akin to Voting, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 203, 228-34 (1995) (suggesting that Members of Con-
gress believed that the right to vote included the right to hold office and did not want to 
appear to endorse Georgia's distinction between voting rights and office holding). 
20. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
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that sound in federalism "should be filtered out" when incorpo-
rated by the Fourteenth Amendment. (p. 275) For example, the 
vicinage and district requirements of the Sixth Amendment do 
not sensibly apply to the states. (p. 275) The entire Seventh 
Amendment might even be filtered out, in light of Amar's argu-
ment that the "best reading of the original amendment" was to 
require federal courts to provide a civil jury trial whenever local 
state courts would do so. (p. 276) 
As for the remaining provisions of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eighth Amendments-e.g., double jeopardy, self-
incrimination, confrontation, compulsory process, right to coun-
sel, bail, cruel and unusual punishment-Amar finds that these 
are "rather easy candidates for incorporation." (p. 278) Amar 
notes that the infamous Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 had "de-
prived blacks of some of the most basic fair-trial rights" and that 
the "Slave Power had also filled the law books with outrageous 
punishments." (pp. 278-79) Even here, however, he finds a 
slight change in meaning as the Bill of Rights is filtered through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, Amar notes that 
while the original ban on cruel and unusual punishment was fo-
cused on restraining judges, it "might have more judicially-
enforceable bite against state legislatures" because a state or re-
gion's cruel punishments can more readily be compared to a na-
tional baseline and judged "unusual" than can an Act of Con-
gress. (pp. 279-80) 
Finally, Amar turns to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments-
amendments that he earlier dubbed the popular sovereignty 
amendments. He largely dodges the question of whether these 
amendments sensibly incorporate, concluding that it "does not 
much matter." (p. 280) To the extent that the Tenth Amend-
ment is about federalism and enumerated federal power, incor-
poration "obviously makes little sense," while to the extent that 
it reaffirms popular sovereignty, "it adds little to the Article IV 
republican-government clause." (p. 280) Similarly, to the extent 
that the Ninth Amendment is a "federalism-based companion to 
the Tenth," incorporation is not sensible, but to the extent if "af-
firms unenumerated rights other than federalism," these rights 
"add little to the privileges-or-immunities clause itself, be-
cause ... that clause is itself obviously open-ended." (p. 280) 
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Ill 
Affiar provides not only a powerful and insightful way to 
view the Bill of Rights at its creation, but also a significant and 
persuasive way to approach the incorporation question. There 
are, nevertheless, important difficulties. 
First, in his efforts to contrast the protection-of-popular-
control-over-government-agents Bill of Rights at its creation 
with how it was incorporated as a protection-of-minorities-and-
individuals-from-popular-government by the privileges or im-
munities clause at Reconstruction, Amar washes out shades of 
grey.21 Some of this is mostly a matter of stylistic emphasis: 
Amar, for example, repeatedly talks about the "core" of the Bill 
of Rights at its creation as majoritarian, thereby suggesting that 
any protection of individual or minority rights was peripheral.22 
But Amar goes so far as to suggest that a primary reason that the 
takings clause, which he acknowledges "seems primarily de-
signed to protect individuals and minority groups," made it into 
the Constitution was that Madison "manage[d] to slip the tak-
ings clause through" by "clever bundling" of the clause with 
other more popular clauses. (pp. 77-78) As Professor Finkel-
man has pointed out in response to Amar's earlier work, how-
ever, there were significant concerns among Anti-Federalists, 
who now found themselves a minority, with protection of mi-
nority rights.23 More generally, "the historical fraternity appears 
to be on the way to concluding that the early history of our re-
public can best be understood by considering Republicanism as 
only one of at least three important civic ideologies-the other 
two being ... Lockean Liberalism and ... Protestant Christian-
ity. ,24 
21. Cf. Rakove, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. at 202 (cited in note 6) (noting that Amar's 
account is missing "texture, by which I mean a willingness to tolerate nuance and ambi-
guity and to provide the measure of descriptive detail that gives historical narrative its 
veracity."). 
22. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Comments on "The Bill of Rights As a Constitu-
tion," 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 99, 109-10 (1992) n agree that it is an over-
simplification to say that the only rights in the Bill of Rights are majoritarian or collec-
tive. I do want, however, to remind us of a tradition that a conventional account has ba-
sically made all but invisible.") 
23. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Amendments As a Declaration of Rights, 16 S. Ill. U. 
L.J. 351,379-89 (1992). 
24. Stephen B. Presser, To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence 
and Constitutional Interpretation, by Scott Douglas Berger, 14 Const. Comm. 229, 230 
(1997) (book review); see also James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christi-
anity, Republicanism and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. Am. Hist 9 
(1987). 
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In addition, Arnar relies rather heavily on the first two 
amendments proposed by the first Congress and the jury trial 
amendments to shape the meaning of the entire Bill of Rights. 
But the first two proposed amendments failed of ratification at 
the time. Moreover, while the bulk of what came to be called 
the Bill of Rights were originally proposed to join the incom-
plete bill of rights in Article I, section 9, the first two proposed 
amendments and the jury amendments were originally proposed 
to be located elsewhere in the constitution.25 
Similarly, the view that the Bill of Rights serves to guard 
against the agency problems of government persisted at least 
into the middle part of this century. Indeed, when Justice Black 
argued in dissent in Adamson that the Bill of Rights was "de-
signed to meet ancient evils," he described those evils as "the 
same kind of human evils that have emerged from century to 
century wherever excessive power is sought by the few at the ex-
pense of the many."26 Although Arnar calls Black's Adamson 
dissent an "heroic reexamination and resurrection" of the privi-
leges or immunities clause and labels the U.S. Reports between 
Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in Slaughter-Housev and it a 
"vast wasteland," he fails to note the majoritarian flavor of this 
passage. (p. 213) 
This omission is significant, and not only because Hugo 
Black stands out as the closest thing to judge-hero in a book in 
which, as Arnar notes, "judges are not exactly the heroes and 
heroines." (p. 305) It is also significant because, as we have 
seen, Arnar relies heavily on the natural law thought of Barron 
contrarians to understand the privileges or immunities clause. 
For such thinkers, the lines between natural law, common law, 
and constitutional law were hardly distinct. Indeed, Arnar spe-
cifically suggests that in deciding whether a provision of the 
Constitution is a personal privilege of citizens, "English common 
law may be of great help here, for it featured expositions of 
many privileges and immunities with counterparts in the Bill of 
Rights, but without the Bill's federalism, majoritarian, and pub-
lic-rights glosses." (p. 225) As Arnar well knows, we have been 
down the road of constitutionalizing common law rights before. 
And as Arnar also well knows, the legacy of this journey is pre-
25. See Edward A. Hartnett, A "Uniform and Entire" Constitution; or, What if 
Madison Had Won?, 15 Const. Comm. 251, 252·53 (1998). 
26. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
27. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
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cisely why Justice Black-unlike the members of the Thirty-
Ninth Congress-did not rely on what Amar calls Justice Wash-
ington's "ode" to fundamental common law rights in Corfield. v. 
Coryell. In Amar's words: "The specter haunting Justice Black 
has a name. Its name is Lochner." (p. 178) 
But the ghost does not seem to frighten Amar as much as it 
frightened his hero.28 Amar does not rush to deny that revival of 
the privileges or immunities clause might lead to Lochner. In-
stead, he merely notes that "the understanding that the privi-
leges-or-immunities clause applied to various common law rights 
may not necessarilllead us to Lochner. "29 (p. 178) With a nod 
to John Harrison, Amar observes that the clause might only 
protect a citizen from discrimination with regard to the exercise 
of common law rights rather than protect the exercise of the 
rights themselves. (p. 178) Thus Amar is rather non-committal 
in addressing the extent to which the privileges or immunities 
clause protects common law rights.31 
Although Amar does not insist on keeping Lochner in the 
grave, he does-despite his well-deserved reputation as an 
iconoclast-pull many punches. He persuasively argues that 
current constitutional doctrine regarding incorporation asks the 
wrong question: Instead of asking whether a given provision is 
"fundamental" under "(substantive) due process," we should ask 
whether it is a personal "privilege or immunity" of individual 
"citizens," rather than a right of states or the public at large. But 
even though current doctrine asks the wrong question, Amar 
nevertheless tells "a tale that, at the end of the day, ends up sup-
porting most of today's precedent about the Bill of Rights." (p. 
307) Indeed, he describes part two of the book as "confirm[ing] 
28. See Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1169, 1176 (1995) ("My own hero is the great Hugo Black, who had an 
abiding faith in the Constitution, the jury, and the people. (And for all this, he was 
mocked by sophisticated cynics in the academy-wise fools!)"). 
29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a decision that might be the har-
binger of a revival of the privileges or immunities clause, see Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 
1518 (1999). 
30. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 
1385 (1992). Harrison, in tum, describes Amar's approach as "by far the best argument 
in favor of incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities Gause." Id. at 1466 n.309. 
31. This non-committal view regarding the proper interpretation of the privileges or 
immunities clause also underscores the significance of Amar's dodge regarding the in-
corporation of the Ninth Amendment. Amar asserts that incorporation of the Ninth 
Amendment "does not much matter" because any unenumerated rights that it affirms 
(other than federalism) add little to the privilege or immunities clause. (p. 280) Thus 
Amar punts the Ninth Amendment question to the privileges or immunities clause, and 
then punts on an important question regarding the privileges or immunities clause. 
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conventional wisdom," (p. xv) and notes that "[f]rom start to 
finish this book has aimed to explain how today's judges ... have 
often gotten it right without quite realizing why." (p. 307) 
Most surprising from a self-proclaimed populist32 is that 
Amar never addresses what is potentially the most significant re-
sult of a doctrinal shift from substantive due process to privileges 
or immunities: the constitutional protection of corporations. 
The Supreme Court decided early on, without hearing oral ar-
gument or providing an explanation, that corgorations are "per-
sons" protected by the due process clause. It has adhered, 
however, to the longstanding view that corporations are not 
"citizens" protected by the privileges and immunities clause of 
Article IV,34 or by the ~rivileges or immunities clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 5 And there is an especially stark tex-
tual reason to insist that corporations are not "citizens" within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: the first sentence of 
that amendment defines citizens to be persons "born or natural-
ized in the United States." Thus a shift of the substantive pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights from due process to privileges or 
immunities should mean that corporations lack such substantive 
protection against the states-a result that populists have long 
sought. But Amar says not a word about it. 
Moving to areas that he does discuss, Amar's strongest cri-
tique of the results of current doctrine is his suggestion that it is 
"hard to justify" the judicial failure to incorporate the right to 
bear arms and the grand jury. (p. 307) But although his analysis 
32. Amar, 65 Ford. L. Rev. at 1657 (cited in note 9) ("I might say that I am a consti-
tutionalist, a textualist, and a populist."). Amar reports that he has asked many nonlaw-
yers, "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States?'' and that 
they "often say 'freedom of the press,' 'the right to keep and bear arms,' 'jury trial,' and 
'habeas corpus.' Every once in a while, someone throws in 'freedom of contract,' or 
'property."' Akhil Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights Against States?, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 443,444 (1996). 
33. The Court made the announcement before hearing argument in Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). "(T)he popular literature 
marks this as the year that the corporation 'stole' the fourteenth amendment." Carl 
Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 Hast. L.J. 
578, 581 (1990) (citation omitted). Interestingly, Chief Justice Waite left it up to the Re-
porter "to determine whether anything need be said about it in the report inasmuch as 
we avoided meeting the constitutional question in the decision." C. Peter Magrath, Mor-
rison R. Waite: The Triumph of Character 223-24 (Macmillan, 1963) (quoting letter from 
Waite, May 31, 1886). See generally Howard Jay Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of 
the Fourteenth Aml!ndment, 47 Yale. L.J. 371 (1938). 
34. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,179-85 (1868). 
35. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945); Selover, Bates and Co. v. 
Walsh, 226 U.S. 112 (1912); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907); Orient 
Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1899). 
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strongly suggests that the judiciary was wrong to incorporate the 
establishment clause, he backs away from announcing that con-
clusion. Moreover, having persuasively explained how the ma-
joritarian and federalistic right to free speech and bear arms 
were transformed into an individualistic privileges, he never ex-
plains why the majoritarian and federalistic civil jury right was 
not similarly transformed. The proceedings under the Fugitive 
Slave Act were, after all, civil actions. 
Perhaps more dramatically, Amar marshals powerful argu-
ments in favor of jury review, but is unwilling to endorse it. He 
notes the widespread belief in the late-eighteenth century that 
juries have the power to decide both law and fact. (pp. 100-01) 
He recounts the story of "perhaps the mos.t famous of all federal 
Sedition Act prosecutions, United States v. Callender. "36 (p. 98) 
There, William Wirt argued in favor of the jury determining the 
constitutionality of the Sedition Act, but was repulsed by Circuit 
Justice Samuel Chase. Amar describes Wirt as "'one of the 
greatest Supreme Court advocates of all time and the man who 
holds the record for years of service as Attorney General,'" 
(quoting Rex Lee), and notes that Chase was impeached for his 
overall handling of the case and for "refusing to allow defense 
counsel in another criminal case to argue law to the jury." (pp. 
98-99) Amar nevertheless states that he is not "wholly con-
vinced" that juries have the power to refuse to enforce laws that 
they consider unconstitutional. (p. 103) 
Amar's reason for balking at jury review leads us to the 
most troubling aspect of the book. As we have already seen, 
Amar contends that the Fourteenth Amendment has a "feed-
back effect" that works to alter the meaning of prior limitations 
on the national government. Although Amar usually deploys 
the notion of a feedback effect to justify applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment's more libertarian and individualistic restrictions to 
the national government as well as the states, here he uses it to 
reduce pre-existing restrictions on the national government. He 
states that the strongest argument against jury review is that 
Civil War Amendments (he doesn't specify which one) implicitly 
"qualified" the power of the jury. (p. 103) 
Amar is certainly right that earlier constitutional provisions 
must be read in light of later ones. Some amendments are 
plainly designed to supersede earlier provisions, and I have sug-
36. 25 F. Cases 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709). 
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gested in an earlier article what our constitution might look like 
if (as Madison had desired) we actually removed the superseded 
provisions and inserted the new ones where they belonged in the 
body of the constitution rather than tacking them onto the end.37 
But as Amar's treatment of jury review reveals, the notion that 
amendments implicitly change the meaning of seemingly-
unrelated earlier provisions can be a rather expansive one. For 
example, consider Amar's sustained argument, based on the 
original constitution and the Bill ofRights, that a national draft 
is unconstitutional. Does the Fourteenth Amendment, as it 
transforms the right to keep and bear arms into a personal right, 
also eliminate the distinction between the feared national 
"army" and the trusted state "militia," thereby permitting a na-
tional draft? Elsewhere, Amar has suggested that the Thirteenth 
Amendment authorizes restrictions on speech that would other-
wise be prohibited by the First Amendment.38 As Judge Kozin-
ski and Professor Volokh have pointed out, why doesn't this rea-
soning also allow the Thirteenth Amendment to trump the Sixth 
Amendment's right to a jury trial, or the Sixteenth Amendment 
to trump the Fourth?39 Indeed, why doesn't the Fourteenth 
Amendment, embodying as it does for Amar a shift from repub-
lican popular sovereignty to libertarian individualism, implicitly 
alter the popular sovereignty reading of not only the jury and 
militia clauses, but also of Amar's treasured popular sovereignty 
preamble, guaranty clause, and Tenth Amendment? 
Amar's argument that amendments implicitly change the 
meaning of seemingly-unrelated earlier provisions opens a gap 
between Amar's methodology and his conclusions. His method-
ology relies on a claim that the same words can mean different 
things in different contexts, that later amendments can affect the 
meaning of earlier words, and that an understanding of the full 
37. See Hartnett, 15 Const. Comm. at281-99 (cited in note 25). 
38. Akhil Reed Amar, Comment: The Case of the Missing Amendments, R.A. V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 124, 155-60 (1992). 
39. Alex Kozinski and Eugene Volokh, Commentary, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 
Harv. L. Rev. 1639, 1650-53 (1993). Professor Herman has made a similar point about 
Amar's argument for a Fourteenth Amendment-based exception to the double jeopardy 
clause. See Susan N. Herman, Reconstructing the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Amar and 
Marcus's Triple Play on Double Jeopardy, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1090, 1104 (1995) (com-
menting on Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After 
Rodney King, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1995)). Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Double Jeop-
ardy Law After Akhil Amar: Some Civil Procedure Analogies and Inquiries, 26 Cumb. L. 
Rev. 23, 29 & n.23 (objecting that it is "just a little too slick" for Amar to use incorpora-
tion to "fundamentally change the nature of an individual right against the federal gov-
ernment"). 
1999] AMAR BILL OF RIGHTS 397 
historical context is necessary to understand a word's meaning. 
(p. 301) But while his history stops with Reconstruction, he 
projects his conclusions forward to today. On Amar's meth-
odological premises, however, he has provided a compelling ac-
count of what the privileges or immunities clause meant in the 
1860's, but-absent an account of constitutional history since 
then-not an account of what it means today. 
This may seem an unfairly harsh criticism. After all, Amar 
has written a wonderful legal and historical account covering the 
Framing and Reconstruction. How can someone complain that 
he only did that, and left out later history? If Amar truly were 
an originalist, claiming that the original understanding of a con-
stitutional provision binds later generations, it would be an un-
fair criticism-although then Amar would be subject to all of the 
standard criticisms of originalists. 
But Amaris not an originalist.40 He does not contend that 
we are bound by the original understanding of the Bill of Rights. 
Instead, he contends that the Barron contrarians and Recon-
struction Republicans transformed the original meaning of the 
Bill of Rights without altering the text of the Bill itself. But if 
they could do that, then subsequent generations could have 
made their own transformations. For example, the Lochner con-
trarians and positivist Progressives who attacked the link be-
tween common law and constitutional law might have (among 
other things) transformed the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process and privileges or immunities 
clauses. Under Amar's methodology, it is impossible to know 
the current meaning of a constitutional provision without con-
sidering the thinking behind all subsequent amendments. 
Amar, then, may be far closer to his Yale colleague Bruce 
Ackerman than appears at first blush.41 Ackerman famously ar-
gues that the Constitution can be amended without compliance 
with the formalities of Article V and without any textual change 
whatsoever-and that the New Deal represents just such a non-
textual, extra-constitutional "amendment. "42 Amar agrees that 
the Constitution can be amended without compliance with the 
40. Cf. Rakove, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. at200 (cited in note 6) (noting that Amaris 
"not really interested in documenting intentions."). 
41. ~~- id. at 192 (referring to the "Yale Law School tag-team of Amar and Ack-
erman .... ). 
42. See Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations 58-67 (Harvard U. Press, 
1991); Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations at 10-31, 279-311 (cited in 
note 6). 
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formalities of Article V;43 he is, however, too much of a textualist 
to accept the idea of an amendment without a text. But once he 
finds a text, he is willing to interpret that text to broadly trans-
form the meaning of prior text. 
In the book's afterword, Amar does make some brief com-
ments about this century's constitutional amendments. There, 
he suggests that perhaps the New Deal was the predictable out-
growth of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amend-
ments, which- by authorizing a progressive national income tax, 
eliminating state legislative selection of U.S. Senators, and pro-
viding for female suffrage in both national and state elections-
increased national power and invited redistributive economic in-
tervention. (p. 300) Amar may be on to something here. With a 
constitution that was framed to rely on structure rather than 
parchment barriers to limit the power of the national govern-
ment, we should not be surprised that major structural changes 
affected the power of that government. Indeed, in opposing the 
Seventeenth Amendment, Senator Elihu Root predicted that di-
rect election of Senators would lead the national government to 
"extend its functions into the internal affairs of the states," pro-
ducing a "concentration of power at the center while the states 
dwindle into insignificance .... "44 Although other factors were 
obviously at work as well, Root's prediction largely came to pass 
with the demise of enumerated power limits on Congress at mid-
century.45 
But if Amar's methodology is correct, twentieth century 
amendments may be important to constitutional issues other 
43. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Gov-
erned: Constitutional Amendment Outside Anic/e V, 94 Colwn. L. Rev. 457 (1994). The 
argument, of coun>e, has not gone unanswered. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, We the 
People(s), Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colwn. L. Rev. 
121 (1996). 
44. See Elihu Root, Address in the Senate of the United States: The Direct Election 
of United States Senators (Feb. 10, 1911), cited in Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, 
eds., Addresses on Government and Citizenship 267-69 (1916). Note, however, that by 
"1912, when the Senate finally approved the Seventeenth Amendment, about 60% of the 
Senators were already chosen by virtual elections" with state legislators pledged to sup-
port the winner of a popular vote. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 
Const. Comm. 201,209 (1996). 
45. See generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking The New Deal Coun: The Structure 
of a Constitutional Revolution 208-25 (Oxford U. Press, 1998) (arguing that the transfor-
mation of commerce clause jurisprudence was not brought about by a "switch in time" in 
1937, but rather by Roosevelt's second term appointments to the Court, and demon-
strating that the Court in 1942 was well aware that it was abandoning judicially-
enforceable limitations on Congressional commerce power). 
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than the scope of Congressional power. That is, under Amar's 
account of the transformation of the Bill of Rights by the Recon-
struction Republicans, amendments can transform the meaning 
of prior text in all kinds of non-obvious ways that are consonant 
with the legal-political assumptions of the victors of the amend-
ing generation. If this is right, then the twentieth century 
amendments might well have transformed the meaning of the 
privileges or immunities clause or even the meaning of the Bill 
of Rights itself. 
Similarly, the sub-constitutional shift in the early twentieth 
century to permit the Supreme Court to exercise discretionary 
control over its own docket may have had crucial significance for 
judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights and indeed may have 
made the incorporation doctrine a practical possibility. Under a 
jurisdictional regime requiring the Supreme Court to review, at 
the losing party's request, every state court decision denying a 
federal right, incorporation of the Bill of Rights would have 
been enormously difficult, if not practically impossible.46 Amar 
does not "try to show why judges were right in refusing to incor-
porate First Amendment freedoms before 1925," (p. 307) but is 
it merely coincidental that incorporation got off the ground in 
1925, four months after the Judges' Bill was enacted giving the 
Supreme Court broad discretionary power to decide which cases 
it would choose to heart7 
Perhaps the most refreshing aspect of Amar's account, 
however, is that (on the whole) judges are either minor players 
or the bad guys. He writes: 
The careful reader will no doubt notice that judges are not exactly 
the heroes and heroines of my tale. Federal judges, after all, en-
thusiastically enforced the infamous Sedition Act of 1798, cheer-
fully sending men to prison for their antigovemmental speech and 
46. The institutional difficulty with incorporation is even greater under Amar's 
iconoclastic reading of Article III, which requires a federal forum for every claimed fed-
eral right-even if a state court has upheld the federal claim. See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 645, 649-50 (1991); Akhil Reed 
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205,254-59 (1985). 
47. See Gitlow v. Connecticut, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925) (assuming First Amendment 
right of free speech incorporated in due process); Judges' Bill, Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 
Stat. 936. See also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Ceniorari: Some Reflections Sev-
enty-Five Years After the Judges' Bill (on file with the author). 
Some trace incorporation back to Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). But while that case held that due process requires com-
pensation when property is taken for public use, it did not so much as cite the takings 
clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
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neutering juries along the way. It is hard to imagine a bigger be-
trayal of the original Bill of Rights, whether we look at the First, or 
the Sixth, or the Tenth Amendment. A century later, the Supreme 
Court strangled the privileges-or-immunities clause in its crib in 
the Slaughter-House Cases; blessed Jim Crow in Plessy; and 
blithely allowed judges to imprison a newspaper publisher (in a ju-
ryless proceeding lacking specific statutory authorization) simply 
because the publisher had the audacity to criticize the very judges 
in question .... Due process of law, according to the Taney Court, 
was satisfied by fugitive-slave hearings presided over by a fman-
cially biased adjudicator, but violated by free-soil laws like the 
Northwest Ordinance. And although Roger Taney himself 
(rightly) had doubts about the federal government's power to draft 
citizens outside of the Constitution's careful militia system, the 
Supreme Court, in the Selective Draft Law Cases, gave this argu-
ment the back of its hand. {pp. 305-306) 
Who, then, are the heroes of Amar's tale? They are the 
"generations of Revolutionaries and Reconstructors who birthed 
and rebirthed the Bill of Rights." (p. 305) And Amar leaves no 
doubt which of these groups he holds in higher regard: While the 
Revolutionaries who created the Bill of Rights were great men, 
"their Bill of Rights was tainted by its quiet complicity with the 
original sin of slavery." (p. 293) The Reconstructors, however-
"women alongside men, blacks alongside whites" -gave us a 
new birth of freedom because they "renounced the Slave Power 
and all its works." (p. 294) 
But if Amar has not yet addressed the heroes of the twenti-
eth century and their impact on our constitution, his work invites 
us to open our eyes to the possibility of such heroes in the 
twenty-first century. Indeed, to my mind, this is the point of 
Amar's project.48 Why does he try so hard to convince people 
that our current understanding of the Bill of Rights is wildly dif-
ferent than the original understanding if, at the end of the day, 
he does not call for a return to the original understanding? The 
point, it seems to me, is to focus attention on the transformative 
power exercised by Barron contrarians and Reconstruction Re-
publicans-and hold them up as a model to emulate. Through 
legal imagination, political organizing, and personal courage, 
48. Rakove makes a similar point about Ackerman's project. See Rakove, 11 Yale 
J.L. & Human. at 209 (cited in note 6) ("[T)he constitutional entrepreneurship of 1787 
and 1866 helps to legitimate the New Deal's radical and permanent departure from es-
tablished doctrine ... (which] in tum legitimates Ackerman's call to the citizenry to be 
prepared to mobilize .... "). 
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they changed the constitution and gave us a new birth of free-
dom. If they could do it, Amar seems to be saying, so can we. 
The book's dust jacket (perhaps in an effort to downplay 
the book's religious imagery) does not include the subtitle. It 
does, however, (perhaps in an effort at dry humor by the graphic 
designers) include the author's name between the first and sec-
ond words of the title. That is, a linear reader (unmoved by con-
trasting typeface and color) would read the title as "The Akhil 
Reed Amar Bill of Rights." Some readers might consider 
Amar's views sufficiently idiosyncratic to make this an apt title. 
Yet Amar's account demonstrates that the meaning of the Con-
stitution in general, and the Bill of Rights in particular, is in the 
hands of each generation. As much as his work provides insight 
into what earlier generations believed about the Bill of Rights, in 
the end, it also serves to remind us that the ultimate question is 
what does this generation believe must be our Bill of Rights. 
